Mittwoch, 23. November 2011

Staatsanleihekäufe und Moral Hazard

Paul De Grauwe schreibt dazu auf VoxEU:
"Like with all insurance mechanisms there is a risk of moral hazard. By providing lender of last resort insurance, the ECB gives an incentive to governments to issue too much debt. This is indeed a serious risk. But this risk of moral hazard is no different from the risk of moral hazard in the banking system. It would be a terrible mistake if the central bank were to abandon its role of lender of last resort in the banking sector because there is a risk of moral hazard. In the same way it is wrong for the ECB to abandon its role of lender of last resort in the government bond market because there is a risk of moral hazard.

The way to deal with moral hazard is to impose rules that will constrain governments in issuing debt—very much like moral hazard in the banking sector is tackled by imposing limits on risk-taking by banks."
Ich denke der Vergleich zeigt ganz gut, dass man das Moral-Hazard-Problem über zusätzliche Regulierung regeln sollte; dass man aber auf der anderen Seite nicht ein institutionelles Feature - den Lender-of-last-ressort für Staatsanleihen -, das man zur Verhinderung von Panikattacken für wichtig befunden hat, grundweg ablehnen sollte.

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