Dienstag, 31. Januar 2012

Das kann dauern ...

Richard Koo fasst in einem neuen Aufsatz noch mal seinen Punkte zu seinem Konzept der "Balance Sheet Recession" zusammen. Unter anderem zeigt er, dass es sehr lange Zeit dauern kann, bis der private Sektor selbst bei niedrigste Zinsen wieder anfängt, Kredite aufzunehmen ... und damit das breite Geldmengenwachstum anzukurbeln.

"After the U.S. private sector’s devastating experience of paying down debt during the Great Depression, the same aversion to borrowing kept interest rates unusually low for a full thirty years, until 1959 (Exhibit 15). The fact that it took the U.S. three decades to bring interest rates back up to 4 percent even with massive fiscal stimuli in the form of the New Deal and World War II suggests the severity of the trauma. Indeed many of those Americans forced to pay down debt during the Depression never borrowed again. The experiences of post-1929 US and post-1990 Japan suggest that interest rates will remain low for a very long time even after private sector balance sheets are repaired."
Er schließt daraus:
"The governments of countries facing exit problems should therefore introduce incentives for businesses to borrow. Such incentives, which may include investment tax credits and
accelerated depreciation allowances, should be exceptionally generous in order to attract private sector attention. The sooner the trauma is overcome, the sooner the government can embark on fiscal consolidation. The generosity will more than pay for itself once the private sector trauma is overcome."
Da derzeit (fast) alle wichtigen Volkswirtschaften in einer Situation sind, in der der Privatsektor Schulden abbaut, sagt Koos Weltbild noch niedrige Zinsen für eine lange Zeit vorher ... und zwar ohne, dass es zu einer Aufblähung der breiten Geldmenge oder ausufernder Inflation kommt.

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