Montag, 20. Mai 2013

Helicopter Money

Auf voxeu wird ein Gespräch zwischen Lucrezia Reichlin, Adair Turner und Michael Woodford über "helicopter money" widergegeben.

Insbesondere die Antworten auf die Fragen 4+5 zu den Implikationen für die Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbanken sind in der Diskussion wichtig.

"I think this [Risiken für die Unabhängigkeit] would indeed be a problem with outright ‘helicopter money’, and it is why I prefer the alternative sketched above. The policy that I proposed would require coordination of monetary and fiscal policy actions, but it could be carried out while preserving a traditional separation of roles."
"In his [Woodfords] option the fiscal authority can increase the fiscal deficit, directly stimulating the economy, confident that there will be no crowding out offset [...]. But that in itself might endanger fiscal indiscipline; the fiscal authority might run increased fiscal deficits to a greater extent than reasonably justified by the nominal GDP target and by the likely permanent increase in the monetary base.

Under the Outright Monetary Financing approach that I propose, by contrast, the scale of money financed fiscal deficits would be clearly determined in advance by an independent central bank. The fiscal authority would decide how to spend the money (the balance between tax cuts and public expenditure): but the central bank would determine the amount of permanent money finance, consistent with an appropriate inflation or money GDP target. And it would do so as an independent central bank, and through the same decision making processes which govern the use of other monetary-policy tools."

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