Dienstag, 27. August 2013

Lehren der Großen Rezession

Mark Thoma schreibt über die Lehren aus der Großen Rezession.

Hier ein paar Auszüge:
"That’s not to say that the Fed’s response to the recession has been perfect. But the Fed did avoid the big error of allowing massive bank failures and declines in banking reserves that were so problematic during the Great Depression, and many people give the Fed credit for avoiding a Great Depression type collapse. [...]

However [...] the improved policy response from the Fed is not the only reason we avoided Great Depression type problems.

First, when the recession hit this time around, we had a much, much higher level of societal wealth, and hence a much larger cushion to absorb the shocks than we had during the Great Recession.  

Second, [...] the presence of automatic stabilizers, particularly those that come in the form of social insurance programs, made a big difference to people hit by the recession. [...]

[...] but a big lesson from our recent experience is that these policies alone are not enough to turn the economy around. Help from fiscal policy is needed. [...]

After the Great Depression, the Fed learned from its mistakes, and it has hopefully learned even more from the mistakes it made in responding to our recent troubles. Monetary policy does seem to evolve and improve over time. But what about fiscal policy? Will fiscal policymakers in the US and Europe learn from the big mistakes they made recently – mistakes that have prolonged the recession and imposed permanent harm on some members of society? 

As much as I’d like to hope that somehow economists will speak with a strong, unified voice on the usefulness of fiscal policy in deep recessions, a position I believe is firmly supported by the empirical evidence, and that politicians – Republican politicians in particular – would follow their advice, it’s hard to imagine either of those things happening. That means, discouragingly, that the next time a severe recession hits fiscal policymakers will likely fail us once again and leave us with yet another unnecessarily slow, agonizing recovery."
Das Problem ist, dass - sosehr ich Marks Einschätzung zur Relevanz der Finanzpolitik als Stabilisator in tiefen Rezessionen teile - das Umdenken in selbiger nicht erst bei der nächsten tiefen Rezession in Taten umgesetzt werden müsste, sondern bereits mittelfristig im nächsten Aufschwung (so er denn mal kommt). 

Denn dann ist die Zeit dafür, die öffentlichen Schuldenstände (in Relation zum BIP) zu verringern, um in der nächsten Krise auch wirklich den Raum für expansive Finanzpolitik zu haben.

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