FT-Alphaville verweist auf eine neue Studie zweier MIT-Ökonomen, die sich mit der Relevanz des Zusammenbruchs vieler Banken für die Tiefe der Großen Depression in den USA befassen.
Hier erst mal das Abstract des Aufsatzes:
"In response to the Financial Crisis of 2008, macroeconomic policymakers employed a range of toolsdesigned to prevent failures of large, complex financial institutions (“banks”). The Treasury and the Fed justified these actions by arguing that bank failures exacerbate output declines, rather than just reflecting output losses that have already occurred. This view is consistent with economic modelsbased on credit market imperfections, but it is an empirical question as to whether the feedback from failures to output losses is substantial.
This paper examines the relation between bank failures and output by re-considering Bernanke’s (1983)analysis of the Great Depression. We find little indication that bank failures exerted a substantial orsustained impact on output during this period."
"This is a potentially very important. After all, as the economists note, if failures have a large impact on output, bailouts are potentially desirable even if they come at a cost. But, if failures have a modest impact on output, the case for bailouts is less convincing. Bernanke’s position has always been based on the fact that the length of the Great Depression could not be explained with theoretical models of money alone. In his opinion, credit scarcity — the result of bank failures — must also have had a non-monetary effect on the real economy, exacerbating the depression."
"For now, the authors conclude:Ich habe den Aufsatz noch nicht gründlich gelesen ... aber wenn er Substanz hat, könnte das ein sehr wichtiger Beitrag für die Wirtschaftspolitik sein.
As Bernanke confirmed, monetary factors do appear to have played a major role in the downturn, consistent with the work of Friedman and Schwartz. But the main avenue through which bank failures mattered seems to have been through their impact on the money supply, rather than via a credit intermediation channel.If the authors are right, then there is a justifiable debate to be had about ongoing bank support and/or the wisdom of too-big-to-fail (beyond the usual debates had thus far). What’s more, if the primary influence bank failures had on output was through their impact on money supply, rather than credit intermediation, there’s another argument to be had about the continuing logic of QE."