Brad De Long schreibt über die veränderte Definition des "short runs":
"Back in 2007 and before I taught my students that the United States was a flexible economy. It had employers who would be willing to gamble and hire when they saw workers who would be productive without work. It had workers who would be willing to move to opportunity, or to try something new in order to get a job. And as these processes took place–as entrepreneurial workers and bosses took a chance–supply would indeed create its own demand. Adverse shocks to spending could indeed create mass unemployment and idle capacity, but their effects would be limited it to one, two, or at most three years. The way to bet, I told my students back in 2007 and before, was that the United States economy would recover roughly 40% of the ground between its current situation and its full employment potential and each year after the initial downturn had come to an end.
2 years, I said, was the domain of the Keynesian (and monetarist) short run. When analyzing events at a 3-7 year horizon, I taught, you were safe assuming a “classical” model–one in which the economy would return to full employment, and in which changes in economic policy and in the economic environment would change the distribution but not the level of spending, production, and employment. And beyond seven years was the domain of economic growth and economic institutions.All of this is now revealed to be wrong for today."
Im weiteren Verlauf des Beitrags beschreibt er kurz die verschiedenen Positionen, die es gibt, um die derzeitige "Verlängerung der kurzen Frist" zu erklären.
Short vs. Long bzw. Konjunktur vs. Trend sind jedenfalls interessante und wirtschaftspolitisch sehr relevante Themen, über die in den kommenden Jahren noch viel geforscht werden wird